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Introduction 
 
 
Geneva II – A Chance to Contain the 
Syrian Civil War 
Muriel Asseburg and Heiko Wimmen 
Internationally mediated talks between the Syrian regime and opposition are due to 
begin on 22 January 2014 in the Swiss resort of Montreux. Their objectives: to end the 
violence and initiate a negotiated transition in the war-ravaged country. However, it is 
still unclear whether it will be possible to gather all the relevant participants around 
the table, nor whether the conference will actually convene at all on the planned date. 
A realistic analysis of the local, regional and international conflicts of interest cau-
tions pessimism in relation to Geneva II’s prospects of success. But the risk of further 
regional escalation, massive refugee movements and a catastrophic humanitarian situ-
ation make a meeting a matter of urgency. Small advances, such as an agreement on 
regional containment or a commitment by all warring parties to respect international 
humanitarian law and to grant humanitarian access, would nonetheless be meaning-
ful. In the interests of the Syrian civilian population, Europe should see to it that the 
meeting provides room to negotiate such measures even if they fall short of a compre-
hensive political resolution. 
 
Almost three years after the beginning of 
the protests in Syria, the situation in this 
country at the heart of the Arab world is 
characterised by armed confrontations, 
warlordism, sectarian and religious strife, 
and a grave humanitarian emergency. 
Syria’s accession to the Convention on 
Chemical Weapons in October 2013 ini-
tiated a process of destroying its outlawed 
arsenal under international supervision 
and participation. As a consequence, and 
despite ongoing massive human rights vio-
lations and brutality towards the civilian 
population, the Syrian regime’s coopera-
tion on the chemical weapons issue has 
enhanced its international reputation. But 
there has been no progress on conflict reso-
lution or humanitarian access. 
Although the regime has, as of early 
2014, lost control of more than half of the 
country’s territory, this still accounts for 
the majority of the population. Various 
rebel groups control villages, small towns 
and rural areas. Parts of the Kurdish major-
ity areas in northern and north-eastern 
Syria are in the hands of the Democratic 
Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, 
PYD), which emerged from the PKK. The 
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regime has answered rebel military suc-
cesses with a policy of scorched earth. 
Whole regions in the provinces of Latakia, 
Idlib, Hama and Deraa have been largely 
depopulated and complete city neighbour-
hoods have been flattened in Aleppo, Homs, 
Deir al-Zor, and the southern and eastern 
outskirts of Damascus. 
The so-called liberated areas have also 
witnessed escalating fighting between dif-
ferent rebel groups. Jihadists of the Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) frequent-
ly battle with the PYD’s Kurdish People’s 
Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, 
YPG). At the turn of the year 2013/2014 
heavy fighting erupted between ISIL and 
different rebel groups, with other Islamist 
organisations such as the al-Qaeda-linked 
Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front 
joining forces with the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) to fight the increasingly aggressive 
ISIL. The latter stands out less for fighting 
effectively against the regime than for its 
rigid enforcement of extremist interpreta-
tions of sharia in the areas it controls. Its 
brutality against activists, journalists, reli-
gious minorities, citizens defamed as “un-
believers”, aid workers and other rebel 
groups has acquired the organisation a 
strongly negative image. In contrast, other 
Islamist groups such as al-Nusra have earned 
respect for their strong fighting spirit, co-
operative attitude and humane treatment 
of civilians – regardless of al-Nusra’s clas-
sification as a terrorist organisation by the 
United States in November 2012. 
Impact on the Population 
The escalation of violence has had massive 
repercussions on the population. Industrial 
and agricultural production have almost 
completely collapsed as a consequence of 
sanctions and fighting; the war damage is 
immense. By December 2013 about 60 per-
cent of the Syrian workforce were unem-
ployed. In early 2014, the number of fatal-
ities was estimated at 130,000, not to speak 
of the tens of thousands injured, detained 
and missing. Refugee movements have 
acquired dramatic dimensions. In Decem-
ber 2013 the UN put the number of Syrian 
refugees registered or awaiting registration 
at more than 2.3 million. Most of them 
are in four neighbouring countries: Turkey, 
Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. The UN estimated 
the number of internal refugees to exceed 
6.5 million. At the beginning of 2014 9.3 
million Syrians out of a total population 
of about 21 million required humanitarian 
aid. 
At the same time access to contested 
areas has been very difficult for humanitar-
ian organisations. Both the regime and in-
dividual rebel groups have repeatedly cut 
off supplies to civilian populations in areas 
controlled by the other side. Since 2012 the 
regime has begun systematically sealing off 
and starving out rebel-controlled towns 
or neighbourhoods, including quarters in 
Homs and Damascus. Bombings, massacres 
and pogroms, sometimes committed by gov-
ernment forces and shabiha militias, some-
times committed by various rebel groups, 
have often been accompanied by extremist 
sectarian rhetoric and have further terror-
ised the population. 
Regional and International 
Involvement 
Over the past three years the parties in 
Syria have been increasingly openly sup-
ported by external actors. Above and 
beyond the internal power struggle, the 
civil war has thus acquired the character 
of a proxy war subsuming international, 
regional and subnational conflicts. The 
conflict over Iran’s regional role has espe-
cially inflamed the Syrian civil war (see 
SWP Comment 9/2012). 
Iran has been supplying the regime with 
financial resources and military materiel, 
as has Russia. Arab Gulf states – increasing-
ly Saudi Arabia, decreasingly Qatar – have 
granted the rebels financial and some mili-
tary assistance and tolerated donations by 
private networks. Western states, above all 
the United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom, joined by Turkey, have also 
 SWP Comments 10 
January 2014 
3 
granted the opposition financial and lim-
ited (mainly so-called non-lethal) military 
support, but in the face of the increasing 
dominance of Islamist groups such support 
has remained restricted in scope and effec-
tiveness and has regularly been called into 
question. 
Indeed, the proportion of fighters with 
Islamist or jihadist backgrounds is today 
estimated at between half and more than 
two-thirds, depending on the source. Such 
numbers are, of course, impossible to 
verify. Also, the number of foreign fighters 
has risen steeply. While thousands of com-
batants from the Lebanese Hezbollah and 
(Shiite) Iraqi militias fight on the side of 
government forces and the shabiha, the 
rebels are increasingly reinforced by (Sunni) 
jihadists from Arab countries, the Caucasus 
and, to a significantly smaller extent, the 
West. Both sides apply the logic of sectarian 
mobilisation (Shiites and Alawites vs. Sun-
nis) to attract new fighters from abroad. 
At the same time, the fighting has 
repeatedly spilled over into and further 
destabilised Syria’s fragile neighbours Iraq 
and Lebanon. In January 2014, ISIL brought 
large parts of the Iraqi province of Anbar at 
least briefly under its control, sparking a 
new round of confrontations between the 
government of Shiite Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki and the Sunni-populated parts of 
the country. Parts of the northern Lebanese 
port city of Tripoli and of the Syrian-Leba-
nese border area in the north-eastern Bekaa 
Valley are controlled by jihadist groups 
with direct connections to Syria. Fighting 
has repeatedly flared up in those areas 
and since autumn 2012 Lebanon has been 
shaken by a new series of bombings (see 
SWP Comment 21/2013). 
The Geneva Platform 
The communiqué of the Action Group for 
Syria issued on 30 June 2012 in Geneva is to 
date the only platform on which the most 
important international actors working for 
a solution of the Syria conflict – including 
important supporters of the conflict parties 
like the United States and Russia – have 
been able to agree (Syrians did not partici-
pate in Geneva I). Alongside ending the 
violence, access for humanitarian aid and 
the release of all political prisoners, the 
Geneva Declaration calls for a “Syrian-led 
transition” with the ultimate goal of a demo-
cratic multi-party system and account-
ability for acts committed during the pres-
ent conflict. To this end, it proposes form-
ing “on the basis of mutual consent” a tran-
sitional government with “full executive 
powers” charged with creating a “neutral 
environment” permitting all groups in 
Syria to participate in democratic compe-
tition. 
The Syrian regime and the opposition 
groups supported by the Group of Friends 
of the Syrian People – first and foremost the 
National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary 
and Opposition Forces (or National Coali-
tion) – have generally accepted these prin-
ciples. But they still hold irreconcilable 
positions concerning their implementation. 
Whilst the National Coalition has regarded 
a political transition as impossible as long 
as Bashar al-Assad and his closest confi-
dants remain in power, the regime has 
rejected any participation by “terrorists”, 
which from its perspective includes all 
armed opposition forces. 
As the international sponsors of the 
Geneva Declaration and crucial third states 
such as Iran and Saudi Arabia also see the 
conflict in Syria through the prism of their 
own strategic interests and have to date 
rejected any compromise, no practical steps 
towards implementation have been taken 
since July 2012. Instead, all parties have 
continued to pursue military victory or at 
least strived to build up military pressure 
that would compel the other side to make 
substantial concessions. A growing reali-
sation that neither is achievable, but that 
instead Syria is fast becoming a new hot-
bed of international terrorism and that a 
regional destabilisation with unforeseeable 
consequences looms, is behind the renewed 
attempt to find a solution on the basis of 
the Geneva I platform. 
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Participants and Interests 
Although United Nations and Arab League 
Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi sent out 
invitations to the Geneva II conference at 
the turn of the year 2013/2014, the list 
of participants is not yet definite. Even so 
shortly before the conference, and despite 
intense coordination efforts, the Syrian 
opposition is in disagreement over partici-
pation. Groups like al-Nusra and ISIL, which 
are internationally ostracised and therefore 
excluded, have branded those who speak 
out for participation as traitors and threat-
ened them with death. But most of the 
other Islamist forces have also categorically 
rejected talks with the Assad regime and 
a negotiated transition. Even a few days 
before the conference it is not clear if 
efforts by the Friends of Syria’s diplomats 
to persuade some of the more moderate 
Islamists, such as the ones that have united 
in the Islamic Front, to attend will be suc-
cessful. Among the relevant armed groups, 
so far only the FSA is supportive of par-
ticipation in Geneva II. Over the last few 
months, though, it has lost a lot of ground 
in the liberated areas to the Islamists. 
In the National Coalition backed by the 
Friends of Syria the decision about partici-
pating in Montreux led to fierce internal 
strife. Only on the weekend before the 
planned date, after massive pressure from 
Western capitals, the withdrawal of more 
than one third of the delegates and the 
suspension of the quorum did the opposi-
tion alliance take the decision to partici-
pate. The move was supported by only 58 of 
originally 121 delegates. Most of the others 
rejected participation as long as the resig-
nation of Assad and his entourage was not 
made a precondition of the meeting. Cor-
responding demands had already been 
formulated at a meeting of “moderate” 
opposition forces in Cordoba on 9/10 Janu-
ary 2014 and led to the withdrawal of the 
Syrian National Council (SNC) from the 
National Coalition two days before the con-
ference. Opposition leaders fear that other-
wise Geneva II would lend new legitimacy 
to the Syrian regime, and that a process 
designated as a transition would merely 
cement Assad’s grip on power. 
These fears are by no means groundless, 
as the regime’s military advances place the 
opposition in an unfavourable negotiating 
position. Not least for that reason it will 
hardly be possible for the opposition to in-
sist on such obviously unrealistic conditions. 
Anyway, doubts are growing among inter-
national actors as to whether the oppo-
sition groups pressed to participate are 
sufficiently united and possess sufficient 
influence on the ground to implement 
agreements, even against the strengthened 
Islamists. 
Worries over steadily increasing Islamist 
influence, along with expanding refugee 
flows and the fear of a spill-over to neigh-
bouring states, motivates the opposition’s 
Western supporters in particular to seek ways 
to resolve the conflict. Recent progress in 
relations with Iran, especially in the talks 
over its nuclear programme, has raised 
hopes that a medium-term stabilisation 
of the volatile Middle East region can be 
achieved. That in turn reduces the strategic 
interest in regime change in Syria and in-
creases the willingness to make concessions 
that might improve the prospects of resolu-
tion or at least containment of the conflict. 
Arab supporters of the Syrian rebels have 
come to exactly the opposite conclusion. 
Saudi Arabia in particular fears that the 
Western-Iranian rapprochement will pro-
ceed at the expense of its own strategic 
position and lead to recognition of Iran’s 
regional power position in the Middle East. 
It therefore seeks to rebuff Iranian influ-
ence in Arab states (alongside Syria espe-
cially Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen). 
In Syria, Riyadh has in recent months 
increasingly worked to consolidate and 
strengthen Islamist groups associated with 
the Islamic Front in order to gain influence 
over the situation independently of its West-
ern allies and limit the influence of groups 
with links to al-Qaeda, which the Saudi 
monarchy also regards as a direct threat. 
By contrast Iran, as the Assad regime’s 
closest ally, sees the Syria crisis as an oppor-
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tunity to reinforce its role in the region. 
Iranian interlocutors underline at every 
opportunity that there can be no solution 
without Tehran’s cooperation and signalise 
willingness to compromise over Assad’s 
future. Indeed excluding Iran – or insisting 
on what it regards a humiliating participa-
tion from the sidelines as proposed by US 
Secretary of State John Kerry – would lead 
Tehran to continue actively supporting 
Assad and encouraging him to adopt a 
harder stance. Accordingly, UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki Moon, on the weekend 
before the conference, invited Tehran to 
participate – but retracted the invitation 
the next day due to heavy US pressure and 
the National Coalition’s threat to boycott 
the conference. 
Russia, whose military and economic sup-
port and diplomatic protection, especially 
in the UN Security Council, make it Assad’s 
second important foreign ally, has consider-
ably enhanced its stature on the interna-
tional stage through its mediation on the 
Syrian chemical weapons issue. Playing a 
similar role in resolving the Syria conflict 
would impressively underline Russia’s 
revived claim to global political relevance 
and demonstrate to other allies the value 
and reliability of Russian support – but 
only to the extent that Moscow can actual-
ly demonstrate real influence and at least 
partly uphold the interests of its client 
Assad. At the same time, Russia has little 
interest in concessions to radical Sunni 
forces or a democratic transition. 
It thus appears unlikely that the Assad 
regime will come under serious pressure to 
make substantial concessions in Montreux, 
still less to relinquish power. Instead the 
conference offers Damascus a promising 
opportunity to present itself once more as 
a responsible and conciliatory actor, while 
the opposition appears as a disparate col-
lection of ineffective, impotent and radical 
forces unfit to govern. It is conceivable that 
Assad’s envoys themselves would take the 
initiative with calls for an “alliance of all 
patriotic forces against terrorism”, assum-
ing that most of the opposition delegates 
would reject such initiatives. In addition, 
Montreux offers the Assad regime a plat-
form where it can portray itself as the 
legitimate government of a sovereign UN 
member-state and demand support in the 
struggle against foreign-controlled “terror-
ists”. Statements by Russian Foreign Minis-
ter Sergei Lavrov in the run-up to the meet-
ing suggest that Moscow would vigorously 
support such a line. 
Challenges of Implementation 
Even if Montreux, despite the obstacles 
outlined above, succeeds in initiating a 
transition, implementing a transition plan 
and ending the conflict will still involve 
considerable challenges. Without a stable 
cease-fire no political process will be pos-
sible. But it is doubtful whether the politi-
cal opposition can ensure observance of a 
cease-fire in the liberated areas, as some 
of the strongest armed groups reject any 
arrangement with the regime and/or will 
remain excluded from a political settle-
ment because of their Islamist outlook. 
They thus have a direct interest in sabo-
taging a cease-fire. It can also be assumed 
that irregular forces on the regime side, 
such as the notorious shabiha militias, will 
use force to defend the privileges they have 
acquired in the shadow of the conflict. They 
could also receive support from elements 
within the regime apparatus that seek to 
prevent political change for ideological 
reasons or to safeguard their own interests. 
Without deployment of a peacekeeping 
force authorised to monitor and enforce a 
cease-fire, the process would be likely to 
fail already during this phase. 
Deep mistrust, sectarian strife and ideo-
logical rifts between the conflict parties 
present high hurdles for the “Syrian-led 
transition” to pluralism and a democrat-
ic multi-party system envisioned in the 
Geneva Declaration. Already the formation 
of a transitional government by “mutual 
consent” would require intense interna-
tional mediation. The more fundamental 
question, however, is how a transitional 
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government would actually be supposed to 
exercise “full executive powers” and create 
a “neutral environment in which the tran-
sition can take place”. The institutions of 
the Syrian state have been hollowed out by 
forty years of Baath rule and wrecked by the 
civil war in many parts of the country. Real 
power is exercised through extensive pat-
ronage networks controlled by the Assad 
clan and closely intertwined with the 
repressive security apparatus. Without 
dismantling these power structures – and 
that is not proposed in Geneva I – any 
transitional process would remain a farce. 
The expectation that once the transitional 
process had begun such institutions would 
operate according to “professional stand-
ards”, respect human rights and submit 
to the authority of the transitional govern-
ment, as assumed in the Geneva Declara-
tion, appears naive. Without direct external 
support a transitional government will 
hardly be in a position to assert its author-
ity against anti-democratic forces within 
the state and security apparatus. 
The demand for legal redress for crimes 
and acts of violence in principle deserves 
support. But Syria has no independent judi-
ciary capable of dealing with such a task. 
Supporters of the regime generally regard 
international courts or tribunals as not neu-
tral but rather as tools in the hands of 
Western states, in particular the United 
States. Calls for an international tribunal 
will therefore meet with bitter resistance. 
Because Syrian society is deeply divided 
in its perceptions of the conflict, a rapid 
process of legal redress is also unlikely to 
lead to reconciliation. Rather, a significant 
part of society would regard such tribunals 
as a continuation of the conflict by judicial 
means. Political currents and religious 
groups would close ranks with “their” 
accused, and a lasting hardening of fronts 
would result. 
Realistic Objectives for Geneva II 
and Policy Recommendations 
The diverging interests outlined above 
make it very unlikely that Montreux or any 
follow-on conferences will make a start on 
implementing the June 2012 Geneva Agree-
ment. That would require first a regional 
and international compromise encompass-
ing a renunciation of a military solution by 
all external actors. Concretely that would 
entail a commitment by all third states to 
withdraw all foreign fighters and/or pre-
vent them from infiltrating across their 
borders into Syria, as well as to stop arms 
deliveries and block the flow of private 
funds for weapons purchases. Even then it 
would probably be impossible to complete-
ly stop the inflow of arms, fighters and 
funds. But if the most important sponsors 
of the conflict to date (the Group of Friends 
of the Syrian People, Russia and Iran) were 
to take serious steps in that direction it 
would without doubt considerably curb 
military supplies. 
Such an approach would second require 
substantial concessions to Assad, not least 
because the West’s threat potential has 
lost a great deal of its credibility since the 
chemical weapons crisis of August 2013. As 
a consequence, a democratic transition and 
an accountability process for human rights 
violations during the Baath rule and war 
crimes committed in the conflict would 
have to be put on the back burner. It would 
third demand direct military engagement 
by external actors to prevent acts of retri-
bution and secure a cease-fire by deploying 
a robust peacekeeping force. 
Such an approach prioritising conflict 
containment over regime change would 
admittedly go much beyond what the West 
and its allies in the Group of Friends of the 
Syrian People have to date been willing to 
contemplate. Nonetheless, it looks like the 
only way to stabilise the country at least 
in the short to medium term and prevent 
further regional escalation. 
In parallel to such an approach, and also 
in the event that Germany and its partners 
are not (yet) prepared to concede such far-
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reaching compromises, it would be both 
sensible and urgent to focus on humanitar-
ian cease-fires and humanitarian access, 
and on persuading all combatants to com-
mit themselves to respect international 
humanitarian law. That would require at 
least indirectly engaging all those rebel 
groups with considerable influence on the 
ground: alongside the so-called moderate 
rebels of the FSA also parts of the Islamist 
spectrum and the PYD. 
The selection of possible cooperation 
partners should then be determined less 
by the ideological or programmatic profile 
of individual rebel groups than by their 
concrete behaviour towards the civilian 
population and their observance of prin-
ciples of human rights and humanitarian 
law. Where stabilisation succeeds, humani-
tarian aid should be combined with sup-
port for the establishment of inclusive local 
self-governance structures that create an 
effective alternative to the rule of the Assad 
regime. 
Germany and its partners should insist 
on the inclusion of all relevant regional 
powers in efforts to contain the Syria con-
flict, and speak out clearly against any stra-
tegically or ideologically motivated exclu-
sion of actors that are indispensable for a 
settlement. In particular, the thaw between 
Iran and the P5+1 should be used to engage 
Tehran in a constructive approach on 
Syria. At the same time, Saudi Arabia and 
the smaller Gulf states must be reassured 
through concrete initiatives and guarantees 
that an improvement of relations with Iran 
will not occur at the expense of their exis-
tential interests. 
Europe should also make sure that ad-
equate room is given to negotiations about 
steps below the level of comprehensive 
political conflict resolution so as to allow 
the situation of the civilian population and 
internal displaced persons to be improved. 
This concerns questions relating to humani-
tarian access, humanitarian cease-fires and 
observance of international humanitarian 
law. 
Last but not least, Germany and its 
partners should initiate preparations for 
a robust peacekeeping force in the United 
Nations framework, as without such a force 
a transition process will stand little chance 
of success. 
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